ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
During the past two decades, the Central and Eastern European financial systems experienced changes, including the opening to attract foreign investments, mainly big banking group, the deconcentration of their banking sectors and the privatization of financial institutions. Such reforms during the early 1990s were expected to increase investment in the region and produce high profits by banking sector.
The stability of CEE banking sectors should be examined in the context of high foreign ownership by Western European banks in CEE. The aggregated CEE exposure of Western European banks remained more or less high in recent years. By year-end 2012, the aggregated CEE exposure of the three most important banking sectors for the region (Austria, Italy and France, representing some 50% of the total regional exposure of European banks or 45% of global cross-border CEE exposure) 1 . On the other hand given the systemic presence of Western European banks in the CEE there had been an extensive debate among academics and policy-makers about the efficiency of CEE comparing to Western European banks in recent years. Is it also a question if deleveraging of Western European banks within a short period of time might have disruptive effects for the CEE economies?
Definition of systemic risk is related to the probability that a given size shock will generate a particularly severe and undesirable outcome. Systemic risk may be due to common exposures or from systemic interdependence due to information contagion, domino effects through contracts, fire sales and asset prices, and the breakdown of market making functions.
Banking sector is by far the most central part of the financial system in most of the emerging economies and is, therefore, also the main source of risk for financial stability.
Traditional banking models do not adequately measure risk position of financial institutions
and cannot be used to understand risk within and between balance sheets in the financial sector. A fundamental subject is that accounting balance sheets do not indicate risk exposures, 1 According to the OECD data base which are forward-looking. Therefore, in the first step of this article we proposes the use of Merton's model, which is mainly used for option pricing as a way to assess the risk of insolvency of the company. The essence of this method is the connection of information coming from the company's balance sheet and market data, containing part of future expectations of market participants. In particular, it seems important to use option pricing methodology, which takes into account the information contained in the market prices about the increasing risks in the financial system. In the second step of research there will be investigating analysis whether systemic risk of banks operating in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), is affected by bank size, risk taking, market determinants or country specific variables, like banking concentration and competition. The study is a continuation of previous studies carried CCA method for the Polish banking sector (Karkowska, 2012) .
Main hypothesis is: (1) Central and Eastern European banking systems are not devoid of systemic risk. The threat of a systemic crisis is ever-present. (2) Systemic risk has not procyclical determinants. It depends on market risk, the banking system specific conditions and risk taken by individual banks.
The paper shifts focus from the country specific variables to financial institutions and the possible causal links between market variables and systemic risk changes. It was consider a set of CEE countries during a period of last seven years that enhanced financial prosperity and slump. It was examined whether country specific variables affects risk in banking system.
To the best of ours knowledge, there is no work considering explicitly such a research of systemic risk in European countries and its determinates.
To measure banking systemic risk it was using Merton's model. And to test our main hypothesis and determinants of systemic risk it was employed a panel data framework using the generalized methods of moments (GMM). The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 shows the relevant literature on systemic risk and its reasons. Section 3 outlines model specification and describes dependent and independent variables used in the analyses. Section 4 presents the data sample and methodology applied. Section 5 presents the results of the investigation. Section 6 concludes study.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The problem of increasing systemic risk in the economy is again widely presented in the literature. Especially a lot on this subject can be read in the IMF reports (IMF, 2008; IMF 2009 ).
The wide scope of research about systemic risk show that there is not a single and agreed approach to this measurement. It suggests that measurements tools should support the understanding of linkages between financial institutions and the macroeconomy. The problem of systemic risk is complex and requires multiple measurements. The literature review finds a few specific approaches for assessing systemic risk along with different kind of data and models.
The study of Brownlees and Engle (2011) , Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008) and Acharya et al. (2010) Billio, Getmansky, Lo, and Pelizzon (2010) .
The second approach is network models of the financial system. The information about financial firm network is very useful in prediction disturbulances, but much more difficult to collect in dynamic financial system. Last time, Cont (2010) and Kim and Giesecke (2010) presented a network-based systemic risk measure. Smets and Wouters (2007) suggested dynamic and macroeconomic equilibrium models.
This econometric estimation measures the transition mechanisms of shocks and its consequences for macroeconomy. The study remains a question how important is the model?
And how to identify consequences of shocks that are very large but infrequent?
The other research apply Jobst (2009), Gapen (2009) Garcia, Gray, Luna and Restrepo, (2010) .
In view of the above literature review, we decides to use CCA method to calculate systemic risk in banking of European emerging markets.
DETERMINANTS OF SYSTEMIC RISK
The section describes the explanatory variables which will be use to analyze determinants of systemic risk scope and size, calculated using CCA method. of in commercial bank.
Assessment of financial stability in general is made on a broad-spectrum of risk factors developing outside and inside the financial system respectively. Recent research on systemic risk has identified three main determinants for systemic crises: (1) Market and macroeconomy variables widespread financial imbalances that unravel with adverse effects on both intermediaries and markets, (2) Banking systems specific variables caused interbank contagion arising from the interconnectedness of banks through the interbank loan market,
Individual risk taking by commercial banks.
Market and macroeconomy determinants
Market and macroeconomy determinants are widely considered as one of the key Several studies establish the significance of volatility as an important measure of financial soundness of the banking system, because of short sell problem. Bank threat liquidity problem when they can't sell assets of its investment portfolio. Risk affecting by liquidity can effect banking sector banking instability. Each bank can issue and repurchase stocks at current market prices to optimise the capital structure.
Economic cycle measure as GDP growth impacts on systemic risk by lending activity
and by credit quality. The improvement in macroeconomic conditions increases demand for credit by enterprises and households so has a positive effect on the banks profitability but cause taking additional risk Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009) . On the other hand, poor macroeconomic conditions can worsen the quality of the banking loan portfolio and consequently generate credit losses and increase banks default probability. Such conditions will result in increasing systemic risk in banking sector. The question is whether the systemic risk has procyclicality?
An environment of low interest rates in economy results in bigger competition among banks. It could cut the opportunity for banks to get appropriate prices for lending and deposits activity. It puts pressure on the margin and consequently negatively influences bank stability.
On the other hand, high interest rates could result in the debt repayment difficulty among borrowers. Consequently, rising interest rate payments may lead to a higher number and volume of non-performing loans Karkowska, Chodnicka, Olszak (2013) , García-Herrero et al.
(2009) and Staikouras and Wood (2003) .
Banking sector specific variables
Causal link between concentration or competition and stability in the financial sector can be found in theory and data. Into consideration there were taken five variables: Z-score as the ratio of return on assets plus capital-asset-ratio to the standard deviation of return on assets. It is an indicator of banking stability. A higher Z-score indicates that the bank is more stable. HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) as market concentrations across banking markets, CR5 is asset share of 5 largest banks, NPL -bank nonperforming loans to total gross loans.
The relationship between competition/concentration and stability is ambiguous in the academic literature. It can be distinguished two opposing views: the first one points to a negative relationship between competition and stability. The second one instead to a positive influence of competition on stability. If we consider systemic risk as the situation, when banks are unable to fulfill their intermediation function, the typically measures is market concentration, such as HHI. But market contestability is also important for evaluating competition in financial markets. The existence of entry barriers must be taken into account in evaluating financial system in a dynamic sense. A study using cross-country data set on 134 countries for the period 1993-2004 provides evidence of a positive relationship between competition and stability (Boyd, De Nicolò and Jalal, 2006 There are two basic channels of propagation financial crisis -leverage and liquidity gap. Excessive leverage and funding gap make the real economy more fragile to adverse shocks. They act as amplifying mechanisms, increasing the effects of solvency and liquidity crisis on the wider economy (BoE, 2009:14, 16; Brunnermeier, Pedersen, 2009 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The study was divided into two part: the first one, in which it was calculated systemic risk in selected European banking systems, using Contingent Claims Analysis (CCA); the second one, in which it was estimated systemic risk determinants.
In the first step -CCA method of systemic risk measures has been used to estimate the market value of the assets of European commercial banks listed on stock exchange. In the study it was applied quarterly data from a were choosen only 21 banks, because that is all, that are traded in a public market (for which data were available). General characteristics of the data are presented in Table 3 .
CCA method description
In order to understand the individual institutional exposure to systemic risk in times of crisis, the method of the CCA and its technique of using risk-based balance sheets of financial institutions are worth analyzing. The CCA method assumes that the total market value of bank assets at any time T is equal to the sum of the market value of equity E and its "risky" debt D at time T. The term of "risky debt" is due to the fact that there is always a chance of company insolvency. The regulation of payment of "risky debt" depends on the quality of bank assets, therefore being a claim against the assets of uncertain value. This type of claim is known as a conditional claim. The methodology of the study has been presented previously by Karkowska (2012) . The CCA method describes the relation between the value of assets and the capital of the analyzed subject, derived from the theory of Black-Scholes option pricing model (Hull, Nelken, White, 2003 ).
where:
E T -value of equity at the time T, Assets take a random distribution and may fall below the value of liabilities which is equal to the level of a bank failure B (often referred to as the "default point" or "distress barrier").
Using the Black-Scholes-Merton model, the value of equity can be expressed as an implied call option on the bank assets with an exercise price equal to the level of B, which is expressed by the formula (4.1) (Gray, Jobst, Malone, 2011 ).
where: In the model, the variables E, B, T, r are directly observable, but the market value of bank assets (A) and its volatility (σA) are not directly observable. Therefore, in order to estimate the market value of the asset and its variability the relationship (Hull, 2003) was used as well.
σ E -volatility of the bank equity.
With equations (4.2) and (4.3) we can calculate the market value of bank assets (A) and its volatility (σA) by successive iterations by comparing the two equations to zero.
Minimizing the value of the expression (4.6) estimate the value of assets and volatility:
The estimated value is a market asset value, as assessed by investors. Let us assume that the relevant bank has a simple structure of financing (equity and foreign liabilities with maturity T). The bank's loss of the ability to pay occurs when at the time T the value of the assets is smaller than the liabilities. It follows that the loss of solvency is a function of the capital structure, the volatility rate of return on assets and the current market value of assets.
When marking the probability to lose the ability to pay by the bank P def we get:
When estimating the probability of losing the ability to pay in the KMV model defined by (4.7), we assume that the random variable -the return on assets adopts normal distribution, and therefore can be represented as a cumulative normal distribution of P def . Which means that we can find the value of a normally distributed variable Z, that decline in the value of assets below this level will mean the bank loss of the ability to pay:
After the appropriate transformations we can determine the probability as:
P def -probability of the bank failure, V 0 -market assets value, V def -limit of the assets value resulting in bankruptcy,
-the actual expected rate of return on assets, t -time to option expiration.
The algorithm (4.9) is defined in literature as a DtD -Distance to Default, the number of standard deviations between the expected value of assets and the level of causing the loss of ability to pay. Use the process of estimating the likelihood of using KMV estimator turns out to be a better credit risk than the actual statistics of rating agencies -such conclusions were reached in the studies by (Kealhofer, McQuown and Vasicek, 2007) . The distribution of assets at time T of the selected barrier solvency is presented in the Figure 1 . Table 2 for each bank individually and for the whole banking sector in each country.
Systemic risk determinants panel model
Because the results showed a large discrepancy we decided to look for reasons for the different phenomena. In the second step it has been investigated determinants of calculated systemic risk in banking systems of CEE country. It was applied the 21 banks covered by largest commercial banks listed on stock exchange. As the estimation model was used one - Table 4 .
Due to the fact that the consistency of GMM estimator depends on the validity of instruments applied in the model (4.10), it was consider two specification tests suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) . The first, is a Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions, which checks the overall validity of the instruments. The other, examines the hypothesis of absence of second-order serial correlation in the first-difference residuals.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this paper, it was used CCA methodology to measure the systemic risk of banking systems in selected CEE countries. It was applied this methodology to the 21 banks covered by largest commercial banks listed on stock exchange. The study finds the estimation of Table 2 . It was creating a map of risk in CEE banking systems.
The highest values of systemic risks shall cover the period of the financial crisis The second step of research finds systemic risk determinants. Results suggest that the systemic risk in the banking sector is driven initially by mainly by bank specific risk premiums and later by the market determinants, like volatility and stock exchange capitalization. Table 6 reports the results of analysis of three groups of factors: 1/ market and marco determinants, 2/ banking sector specific variables, 3/ risk taking by individual banking.
The first part of Table 5 reports the results of market and macro determinants. SRISK is significantly affected by only market specific variable, i.e. negative by stock exchange capitalization CAP and positive by volatility VIX. The positive impact of VIX on SRISK suggests that with rising volatility in the market, the banking systems instability. The negative impact of CAP is probably connected with a decrease in the possibility of liquidity regulating by banks during periods of downturn. In the regression (No1) a significant influence also proved to be LIQUIDITY in the interbank market. It is the results of traditional activity in CEE banking systems -the interbank market is used as a source of money loans and deposit for banks. Lack of liquidity in this market raises a number of instability risks. Liquidity is a significant factor in analysis of banking instability employed by Demirguc¸ -Kunt and Detragiache (2008) .
Marco determinants, as GDP, monetary policy and interest rates proved to be no significant impact on the variability of systemic risk in CEE countries. The interactions between the value of GDP growth and the changes in banks stability are mostly negative but not significant. Our lagged dependent variable, which measures the degree of persistence of our systemic risk is statistically significant across all models, indicating a high degree of persistence of bank instability and justifying the use of a dynamic model.
In the second part of Table 5 (regression No2) 
CONSLUSION
The aim of the study was to calculate the systemic risk in CEE banking systems and identify its changes. Also it was investigated the determinants of these banking instability using panel regression models. Our results present interesting conclusions. Firstly, the study supports to the recent economist study on the increased systemic risk complexity and heterogeneity. The results show that banking instability is changing across countries and time.
There is still a problem of systemic risk in CEE banking systems. The measures is not perfect, as was mentioned in the introduction has flaws, but it seems to be considered to support policy discussion and analysis. Nevertheless, confronting the various analysis of uncertainty with some measurability will help us to use models in meaningful ways. 
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